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The reconstruction of the international order after World War I put great emphasis on 
social reforms through the International Labor Organization (ILO).  Three types of 
arguments were used to promote social reform.  The first asserted that international 
economic competition meant that social reform had to be coordinated internationally in 
order to maintain the relative competitiveness of countries.  The second proposed that 
social reform was necessary to preserve the stability of states, and hence the stability of 
the international system.  The third appealed for international action on the basis of 
common notions of human dignity.  The idea that common concern about human dignity 
demanded international action became an assertion of human rights.  While this 
understanding of human rights has helped to inform the pursuit of social justice, the 
history of the founding and program of the ILO in the interwar period shows that other 
arguments for social reform have also been historically influential. 
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  The reconstruction of the international order after World War I put great emphasis 
on social reforms.  The Treaty of Paris that ended WWI included a list of general 
principles that reflected prewar demands for a labor charter of rights, and also set up the 
International Labour Organization as permanent machinery for the pursuit of social justice. 
 This idea of social justice included the improvement of working conditions, the right to 
form workplace associations, the payment of a living wage, and the provisions of 
education and social security.  Recent discussion of post-Cold War reconstruction has 
included little discussion of the role of social reform in the new international order.  
Looking back on international actions after WWI offers a view of how social reform can 
be linked to international security, and evidence on the effectiveness of particular 
arguments in generating international action. 
  Three types of arguments were used to promote international efforts for social 
reform after WWI.  The first asserted that the existence of international competition meant 
that social reform had to be coordinated internationally in order to maintain the relative 
competitiveness of countries.  The second proposed that social reform was necessary to 
preserve the stability of states, and hence the stability of the international system.  The 
third appealed for international action on the basis of common notions of human dignity.  I 
will examine the history of these arguments, and their relation to the program of reforms 
that the ILO pursued in the interwar period. 
  After WWII, the ILO reformulated its mission, and the third argument emerged 
predominant.  The idea that common concern about human dignity demanded international 
action became an assertion of human rights.  This assertion of human rights preceded the 




may have in fact have made an important contribution to these latter statements.  While 
this understanding of human rights has helped to inform the pursuit of social justice, the 
history of the founding and program of the ILO in the interwar period shows that other 
arguments for social reform have also been historically influential. 
 
I.  Social Reform and International Economic Competition 
 
  An important motivation for international action to promote social reform at the 
end of World War I was the recognition of the effects of international competition on 
labor and social conditions within countries.  The Paris Peace Treaty noted: "...the failure 
of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other 
nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries."
2  The underlying 
idea is that international competition creates a problem of collective action.
3  All countries 
would prefer to have better working conditions, but individual countries do not have 
incentives consistent with this collective preference.  In particular, given that other 
countries have not improved working countries, a country that did improve working 
conditions would lose competitiveness in international markets.  Thus unilateral action is 
undesirable. 
  The logic of the above argument is not particular to that time or the international 
context.  As one proponent of factory legislation argued in early nineteenth century 
Britain: 
...masters should stand out for prices in the market, which would enable them to give 
sufficient wages to those who produce the article; and this perhaps they may do if the 
burden were laid equally on all, and one master was not permitted to work his mill 
                                                 
    2 Treaty of Paris, Labor Section, Section I., Preamble.  In Shotwell, Origins, Vol. I., p. 425. 






Moreover, the authors of a 1926 study on British factory legislation noted that the idea of 
a relationship between fair competition and common norms predated the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The guild prohibitions of work at night seem to have been partly due to the desire to 
maintain a high standard of quality in the product which might be endangered by 
night work, the prescription of holidays partly to religious motives, and both 
probably also to the idea that as the normal citizen went to church on festivals and 
slept at night, it was unfair that he should be injured in his business by the 
competition of those who infringed these orderly customs.
5 
  It is important to recognize that common norms do not necessarily have an equal 
impact.  The technological diversity and range of labor systems that persisted in the early 
decades of the cotton spinning and weaving industry meant that factory legislation 
potentially had much different effects on different factory owners.
6  This helped to split the 
ranks of factory owners over factory legislation.
7  Moreover, the technological and 
organizational diversity meant that the industry could adapt by shifting composition as 
well as by the adaptation of individual firms.  Thus common norms can also plan an 
important role in pushing technology and the organization of work in a socially desirable 
direction.
8 
  The impact of international competition also emerged as an issue in the early 
nineteenth century struggle over factory legislation.   One factory owner put the matter 
quite simply: 
We consider it beyond doubt that any measures which tend to enhance the cost of 
yarns to the English spinner will operate in so far against them as to open a wider 
                                                 
    4 Edwin Rose, an engineer testifying before the Factory Commission of 1833. P.P. 1833 (xx) V.1.124. 
    5 Hutchins and Harrison, Factory Legislation, p. 2. 
    6 See Galbi, "Child Labor." 
    7 The issue was not as simple as "good" owners versus "bad" owners.  Some factory owners who took 
an active interest in the health and conditions of the workers, such as the Ashworths, were opposed to 
limitations on ages of work. 
    8  In Industrial Democracy, the Webbs argued that factory legislation helped to eliminate socially and 




field to the continental spinner.
9 
Such an argument could be and was extended to the argument that factory legislation 
would ultimately hurt the people it intended to protect, by destroying the industry on 
which they depended for their livelihood.
10 In fact, the impact of factory legislation on 
competitiveness, particularly in the long term, was difficult to analyze.
11   Charles Hindley, 
an advocate of factory legislation, presented a relatively sober analysis to the Factory 
Commission:   
will not the English cotton spinner be ruined [by a 10-hours bill], seeing he will have 
the same outlay of fixed capital, higher wages to pay, and nearly one-sixth less 
return? -- (Hindley) He would certainly derive less interest from his fixed capital.  I 
am of the opinion, however, that with a proper system of taxation, and free trade, the 
English spinner, with his advantages of mechanical improvements, concentration of 
everything necessary for manufacturing, and skill of the working people, would be 
able for many years to compete with his foreign rival, even though the latter would 
employ his hands for a somewhat longer period.
12 
Hindley recognized that tax and tariff policy also affected the competitiveness of British 
goods.  Moreover, he recognized that the competitive position of British firms did not 
depend merely on the level of wages: technology, industrial organization, and the skills of 
the workforce also mattered.  If factory legislation simultaneously pushed the industry to 
new technology, better organization, and higher skills, then the effect of the legislation 
would not necessarily be negative. 
  Hindley has achieved a small measure of recognition in the history of factory 
legislation not because his balanced analysis of the effects of factory legislation was 
                                                 
    9 Snunch, Mytius and Co., testimony to the Factory Commission of 1833, P.P. (XX) D.1.123. 
    10 This a version of the perversity argument described in Albert Hirschman's book, The Rhetoric of 
Reaction. 
    11 Some British factory owners gathered statistics about wages in Europe in an attempt to prove that 
British wages were high relative to rivals' wages, while others pointed out that the higher wages of British 
workers reflected their higher productivity.  Such static comparisons have little direct implications for the 
differential impact of factory legislation.  See Cowell, P.P 1834(XIX) D.1.119w.  





proved correct by history, but because he offered an additional suggestion:   
Should it, however, unfortunately happen that the excessive competition of foreigners 
should endanger our trade, unless we employed our people longer than was advisable 
for their own comfort and the good of society, I think it would be as proper a subject 
of treaty with foreign nations as the annihilation of the slave trade.
13 
This suggestion, like Hindley's response to the question of hours limitations, presented a 
analytical and rational approach to a politically charged issue.  The ability of arguments 
focusing on international competition to avoid much of the bitterness that surrounded the 
struggle over factory legislation may have been one reason for their importance. 
  In 1838 Daniel Legrand, who came from a rich and eminent Swiss family, began a 
sustained effort to promote international social legislation.  For twenty years he argued for 
international social legislation on a variety of grounds.
14  With respect to the argument 
about international competition, Legrand was quite forceful:  
An INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION to the 
great social problem of granting moral and material well-being to the working class 
without working a hardship upon the manufacturers or upsetting the competitive 
balance between the industries of these countries...  An international factory law has 
an immense advantage over national laws.  it can afford moral and material benefits 
to the working class without prejudice to the manufacturers and with the least shock 
to international competition.
15  
Legrand's efforts to bring about international labor law were concentrated on persuading 
government officials of the merits of such action. One of his tactics was to encourage the 
wider ratification of restrictive national laws.  In 1840 he appealed for the Prussian Labour 
Act of 1839 to be extended throughout Germany and Switzerland.  Later he pressured the 
French to keep up with the British after the British passed the Ten Hours Act.  The 
problem with this tactic is that is comes up against exactly the problem of individual 
                                                 
    13 Ibid. 
    14 See Follows, Antecedents, Chapter 3 and Appendix II.  In ensuing sections I will discuss the other 
arguments that Legrand used. 




incentives that coordinated action was meant to overcome. 
  The efforts of Legrand and others throughout the nineteenth century meant that 
the argument about the relationship between international competition and social reform 
was well-known to the drafters of the post-WWI peace settlement.  This peace settlement 
was recognized as an opportunity to take collective action on labor legislation.  The 
British presented a detailed proposal to create a permanent organization that would meet 
yearly to pass international conventions.  States would be required to submit to national 
legislatures conventions that the international conference approved.  Thus the British 
proposal amounted to giving a international body agenda-setting powers in national 
legislatures.  In the final text this is in fact the power that the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) received, with the exception that for federal states, conventions could 
be treated as recommendations that did not carry the requirement of legislative 
consideration. 
  Other delegates, however, were ready to give the ILO actual legislative power.  
An Italian delegate noted "in all countries it was felt more and more strongly, both by 
workpeople and employers, that their needs were better understood and better served by 
industrial bodies than political assemblies."  The delegate proposed that all members of the 
ILO "shall be obliged to carry out within one year Conventions approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the Conference."
16  Governments would be given the right to appeal to the 
Executive Council of the League of Nations, which would decide whether to refer the 
Convention back to the Conference.  A Belgian delegate protested, arguing:  
The system outlined by the Italian Delegation amounted to the creation of a super-
Parliament.  One might hope that this would be a system of the future, but it was not 
practical at the present moment, and if it were adopted there would be a grave risk of 
raising such opposition as to render the work of the Commission nugatory.
17 
                                                 
    16 ILO Official Bulletin, p. 51. 




The Belgian position received support of delegates from the U.S., Britain, Japan, Cuba, 
and Poland, and the Italian delegate withdrew his proposal.  The next day the French 
delegation proposed a resolution: 
The Commission ...[while agreeing with the British proposal]...expresses the hope 
that, as regards international labour legislation, a deliberative international 
assembly will be constituted as soon as possible, and endowed with the powers 
proposed by the Italian Delegation.
18 
The Belgian delegate who had originally objected to the Italian proposal declared that he 
was in principle in favor of the French resolution.  On the other hand, a British delegate 
protested that there was more important work to do than to pass "platonic resolutions," 
while the American delegate expressed reservations, noting that states were jealous of 
their "independence."
19 
  The movement for international labor standards was historically a European 
movement, but the ILO was intended to be responsible to the world.  One reason that the 
diversity of social and economic conditions around the world did not emerge as a major 
issue is that the commission which drafted the ILO charter for the Peace Conference was 
primarily European.  The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Belgium each had two 
representatives, and Cuba, Poland, and Czecho-Slovak Republic each had one.  Moreover, 
as one of the British delegates explicitly acknowledged, the fact that European labor 
standards would impose larger burdens on China and India than on European countries 
was seen as an advantage -- it would help the European retain markets in those 
countries.
20  On the other hand, it was felt that children in India matured earlier than 
children in colder climates and hence were more capable of work, and that the relatively 
low productivity of Indian labor justified longer hours.
21  With respect to the need for 
                                                 
    18 Ibid., p. 54. 
    19 Ibid, p. 56. 
    20 Barnes, History, pp. 45-6. 




unemployment insurance, an Bengal Labor Office official at a League of Nations Union 
meeting noted: "...it might be stated that India had no unemployment problem.  The state 
of industrial society in India was such that a man out of work could return to his farm and 
remain there until further employment was offered him."
22  These questionable arguments 
were not considered in any depth.  Instead, the constitution of the ILO simply included the 
provision: 
...the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climactic 
conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organisation, or other special 
circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different, and shall 
suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case 
of such countries.  
  The ILO, as finally constituted, had only agenda-setting power and was not a 
powerful instrument to address the problem of collective action in enacting labor 
legislation.  But the issues to be addressed did not change, and the ILO pushed ahead with 
its agenda.  A prominent issue of labor standards was the eight-hour day.  In 1919 the 
Conference passed a convention establishing an eight hour day, but by 1930 only nine 
countries had fully ratified the convention.  France ratified the convention subject to the 
condition that it would go into force only when Great Britain and Germany also ratified it, 
while Italy ratified it subject to the condition that Great Britain, Germany, France and 
Switzerland also ratify it.
23  The problem of collective action apparently was significant 
among the European countries with respect to the eight-hour day.   
  The need for institutions to promote beneficial international economic interaction 
was also apparent in the field of social insurance. Before the formation of the ILO, Europe 
experienced a stream of bilateral agreements concerning social insurance.  In the Franco-
Italian Treaty of April, 1904, means were established such that pensions contributions 
                                                 
    22 League of Nations Union, Social Insurance, p. 211. 




could be transferred between the French and Italian insurance systems.
24  The Swiss-
Italian Treaty of July, 1904, provided equivalent workmen's compensation for the 
nationals of one country working on the other's territory.  The German-Italian Treaty of 
December, 1904, and the German-Austro-Hungarian Treaty of January, 1905 accorded 
equal treatment for foreigners and nationals in the contracting states.  Requiring equal 
treatment was administratively simpler than requiring equal benefits, and the equal 
treatment approach prevailed in a stream of treaties over the next ten years.
25  Thus the 
effect of these treaties was not to harmonize non-wage costs but to facilitate the operation 
of the international labor market. 
  But as with hours legislation and labor standards, there was concern that 
differences in the scope of social insurance systems could affect 
the competitive position of states.
26  In April of 1926 the British Ministry of Labour asked 
the ILO to do a comparative study of the cost of social insurance in different countries.  
The ILO's Committee of Experts noted 
... that the question of the cost of social services was being discussed in all countries, 
that inaccurate or incomplete statistics were being produced, that comparative 
international tables were being drawn up based on heterogeneous and 
incommensurable data, and that false conclusions were thus being laid before the 
public.
27 
In short, opponents of national social insurance schemes were using arguments about 
international competition to attack the schemes.  The Committee of Experts resolved to 
produce impartial and properly checked statistics in order to clarify the issues.  
                                                 
    24 Italy also promised to set up a system of labor inspections and to study how to bring labor standards 
in Italy in line with the stricter French standards.  Lowe, International Aspects, p. 97-98. 
    25 Ibid. 
    26 R.H. Butler, a British citizen and the Deputy-Director of the International Labour Office, noted:  
"Complaints are commonly made in this country and in other countries that the burden of these social 
charges [those associated with social insurance] constitutes a handicap in international competition which 
has now become more acute, perhaps, than at any previous period."  Social Insurance, p. 172. 




  In the course of planning the collection of statistics, an important issue arose: 
should the statistics include costs of social assistance as well as the costs of social 
insurance?  While it was recognized that social insurance was more progressive, the issue 
was the competitive implications of the cost of welfare programs, not their efficiency or 
justness.  The committee concluded on theoretical grounds that social assistance charges 
should be included in the statistics.  Unfortunately, since most social assistance 
expenditure was local and ad-hoc, accurate statistics on this type of expenditure were 
difficult to obtain.  The Committee compiled an impressive mass of statistics, but 
concluded:  
...on the basis of the information at present available from the different countries, it 
was impossible to make any international comparison of social charges, and that it 
was the duty of the Office to report accordingly so as to impress this fact on 
individuals, administrative departments or associations which might be tempted to 
make such international comparisons, which would inevitably lead to erroneous 
conclusions.
28 
Especially with respect to the whole range of international comparisons, such a 
conclusions seems so cautious as to border on the ridiculous.  It may in fact reflect the 
reluctance of the ILO to be drawn too overtly into political battles about competitiveness 
within Europe. 
  The problem that international competition creates for domestic programs to 
improve labor standards and social security has been historically a recurring lament.  Yet 
the relative importance of labor conditions and non-wage benefits in affecting 
competitiveness is difficult to establish.
29  In addition, the actual role that the ILO played 
in mitigating the problem of international competition for social reform was rather limited, 
                                                 
    28 Ibid. 
    29 In fact, the Fabians in early twentieth century England argued that the conflict between social 
conditions and competitiveness was largely imagined; social reform promoted national efficiency while 
sweated trades lead to industrial stagnation.  See the Webbs, Industrial Democracy, and Beatrice Webb, 




despite the explicit recognition that this problem received in the Treaty of Paris.  Consider, 
for example, what C. Wilfred Jenks, who served as Director-General of the ILO, had to 
say about arguments focusing on the implications of international competition: 
While the precise inter-relationship of labour standards, labour efficiency and 
competitive capacity in the international market may be complex and subject to 
debate, no one who is familiar with the political history of international commercial 
policy, including such chapters as the reciprocal trade agreements programme in the 
United States, the economic integration movement in Europe, and the problem of 
competition with established industries from new industries in underdeveloped 
countries, can doubt that this proposition reflects a widespread view of governments, 
management and labour alike which is a substantial factor in contemporary 
international economic relations.
30 
  Why have arguments about the implications of international competition been, 
despite their meager economic support, historically so important in the push for 
international cooperation?   A distinct advantage of arguments about the implications of 
international competition is that the international dimension of competition is easily 
recognized.  There is no need to search for common values to justify common action; 
interdependence through competition provides the justification needed.  This means that 
goods like labor standards, work conditions, and insurance benefits, like other goods, 
become part of international "trade."  Thus they fit within an existing international 
language.  Moreover, trading partners do not need to hold common views about the value 
of particular goods.  They just need to be willing to do a deal.  Discussion focuses on what 
legislation is consistent with fair trade, so that social justice becomes another dimension of 
competition.  
  One implication of linking social justice to competition in this way is that social 
justice focuses on the worker rather than on the citizen.  More particularly, wage-earners 
in industries producing goods that are traded internationally are the primary concern.  
                                                 




Workers in the subsistence economy or producing non-tradable goods, and children, 
women, and men in the home are a secondary issue, if an issue at all.  For developing 
countries this is a particularly significant concern.  One response might be to argue that the 
example of reform in a few sectors helps to stimulate further reform in other sectors of the 
economy.  Another response is to seek a different basis for international action to promote 
a more comprehensive program of social justice. 
 
II.  Social Reform and Social Stability 
 
  In justifying the formation of the International Labour Organization, the Peace 
Treaty argued: "conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation 
to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of 
the world are imperilled."  According to a delegate to the first International Labor 
Conference in 1919, the architects of the Paris Peace Treaty recognized: 
the world's peace may depend to no small extent upon the conditions of the toilers in 
every land, and that as a necessary part of any program for insuring [sic] the world's 
peace there should be an international labor organization which might, by a program 
of policies and reforms, seek to establish industrial peace among the nations, better 
living conditions for the toiling masses, and so contribute to human progress 
throughout the world.
31 
Promoting industrial peace, better living conditions, and human progress could well be 
valued as ends in themselves; here they are also presented as instrumental for the pursuit 
of world peace, meaning peace among states. 
  The argument that social reform was necessary for peace had appeared early in 
discussions of domestic reform.  In the 1926 study of the history of factory legislation 
referred to earlier, the authors note the tactics of an early nineteenth century British 
                                                 





Instead of an emotional appeal to humanity, he [the reformer, a physician] points out 
the risk incurred by the better classes from the fevers generated by the dirt and 
misery of the factory population, and says with perfect truth and perhaps a touch of 
cynicism, that the "safety of the rich is intimately connected with the welfare of the 
poor."
32 
One difference between this argument and the argument in the Treaty of Paris is that 
concern is about international peace, which is important to both the rich and the poor, 
rather than just the safety of the rich.  On the other hand, arguments for reform in terms of 
concern about social stability generally do generate tension in that they degrade certain 
goods to the status of means.  Daniel Legrand, arguing for factory legislation in Europe in 
the 1840's, attempted to obscure this problem by asserting a happy coincidence: 
Such a law would shower blessings upon the governments accepting it, for it would 
improve the morality and well-being of the people and become a guarantor of order 
and public security.
33 
That such a coincidence can occur to a certain extent is clear; the issue is whether the 
coincidence is broad enough to support needed efforts for social reform in a given 
instance. 
  In 1919 the fear that working class revolution would be encouraged and supported 
across national borders helped make the avoidance of class strife within nations an 
international concern.  The mobilization required for the Great War strengthened trade 
unions, and the International Labor Conference at Leeds in July, 1917 and the 
International Conference of Trade Unions in Berne in October, 1917 generated 
transnational support for a wide range of workers' rights.
34  The Bolshevik Revolution in 
                                                 
    32 Hutchins and Harrison, History, p. 13, quoting "Ferriar's Medical Histories and Reflections," Vol I. , 
pp. 261, 289. 
    33 Follows, Antecedents of the ILO, p. 197. 
    34 For example, the Leeds Conference resolved: "The conference declares that the peace treaty which 
will terminate the present war and will give to the nations political and economic independence should 
also insure to the working class of all countries a minimum of guarantees of a moral as well as a material 




Russian in 1917 brought to power a regime which explicitly promoted an international 
communist movement.  With the creation of the ILO, the architects of the Paris Peace 
Treaty sought to create an alternative, preferable means for workers to pursue their 
demands.  One scholar noted, "No one can deny that if the workers were to turn away 
from Geneva [the ILO] the opening sentence in a long story of revolution -- and war -- 
would have been written."
35  The Russian Encyclopedia offers a similar analysis with a 
different emphasis in its description of the ILO: 
International Labor Organization -- an institution, organized in 1919 within the 
League of Nations on the basis of the Versailles Peace Treaty, formally -- for working 
out international conventions and recommendations on questions of social 
legislation, for the study of problems of labor; factually -- for the spreading of false 
reformist illusions with the help of the right social-democrats and for diverting the 
working classes away from revolutionary class warfare.
36 
  The threat of communism in the interwar period arose from class conflict, rather 
than from international conflict as was the case during the Cold War.  Tripartism, a 
distinctive institutional characteristic of the ILO, was an important innovation to address 
class conflict.  In the ILO each country has one labor representative, one employer 
representative, and two government representatives; on all matters each representative 
votes independently.
37  Thus the labor and employer representatives sit in the same 
capacity as the government representatives.  Actions of the International Labor 
                                                                                                                                                                          
protection of labor, in order to secure them against the attacks of international capitalistic competition."  
See Shotwell, Origins, V. II., p. 23. 
    35 Wilson, Labor in the League System, p. 281. 
    36 Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsilopediia (1954), quoted in Alfred Fernback, Soviet Coexistence, p. 6. 
    37 There was some debate about whether governments should have two representatives, or one.  The 
British argued that giving government two representatives lessened the ability of employers to block 
conventions.  Since decisions required a two-thirds majority, if government, employers, and labor each 
had one representative, the employers could block decisions by attracting only one additional government 
vote. The British were clearly also concerned about taking too much power away from governments.  See 
Shotwell, Origins, V. II., p. 121, 332-5.  The French, Belgians, and Italians initially favored equal 
representation.  Samuel Gompers, the leader of the American delegation, also favored equal 
representation; he argued: "there are really only two groups in society -- the employed and the 




Conference, such as establishing a convention, require a two-third's majority of delegates. 
 These arrangements contrast sharply with those of the League of Nations, in which only 
governments were represented and action required a unanimous vote.  The structure of the 
ILO promoted dialogue between interest groups within countries and across countries, 
and helped assure that labor's voice was heard in the international system.  
  The ILO passed a series of conventions that sought to promote social insurance.  
In 1925 the International Labor Conference adopted a general resolution on social 
insurance that declared: "the maintenance of a healthy and vigorous labour supply is of 
capital importance" for workers and for industrial development.  The resolution noted that 
"this development is only attainable by constant and systematic endeavor to obviate all 
avoidable loss or diminution in the efficiency or earning capacity of wage earners."  
Moreover, "the principle of social justice" required "effective protection of the workers 
against risks endangering their livelihood, or that of their families," and "this protection 
can best be attained by means of the establishment of a system of social insurance granting 
clearly defined rights to the beneficiaries."
38  Over the next ten years the ILO passed a 
series of social insurance conventions organized around different types of risks: accidents, 
sickness, old age, invalidity, widowhood, maternity, and being an orphan.    
  One might argue that the ILO's push for social insurance really reflected an 
international dimension of labor's efforts to bring about a redistribution of benefits in its 
favor.
39  Yet as Baldwin has pointed out in a historical review of national struggles for 
social insurance, the battle lines for social insurance were seldom drawn along traditional 
class lines.  He argues that the specific redistribution implied by a particular policy and 
                                                 
    38 ILO, "The ILO and Social Insurance", pp. 121-123. 
    39 Or similarly, one might argue that the social insurance agenda was a concession to labor to forestall 
social strife.  This sort of interpretation is a prominent interpretation of the introduction of social 




distribution of risks was "calculated time and time again for each new round of legislation 
with uncanny precision," and that "the major engagements over social insurance legislation 
have consistently been fought between winners and losers defined in these terms."
40  The 
ILO's position as to the share of insurance costs to be assigned to workers, employers, and 
government is interesting to consider in this regard.  Apparently unlike Baldwin, the ILO 
recognized an important distinction between legal and economic incidence.
41  In particular, 
cost sharing between workers and employers can be modified through offsetting changes 
in wages, and firms might shift a portion of costs forward through increase in prices.  
Moreover, the burden of government taxes to fund insurance systems depends on the 
structure of tax system.
42  The ILO had no illusions about its ability to fully describe or 
prescribe the redistribution that social insurance actually produced. 
  The primary thrust of the ILO's work on social insurance was in fact to promote 
institution-building. The economic insecurity of workers was recognized as a serious 
problem,
43 but the problem was an administrative rather than a legislative task.  Thus it is 
not surprising that the legislative content of the social insurance conventions was rather 
thin.  None of the general social insurance conventions specified the amount of benefits 
that should be paid.  They did, however, impose some specific conditions on the 
institutions to be created.  For example, the sickness insurance convention declared: 
"Sickness insurance shall be administered by self-governing institutions which shall be 
                                                 
    40 Baldwin, Politics, p. 40. 
    41  In particular, whether the employer or the employee pays a social insurance tax on wages has no 
direct economical significance.  See also below. 
    42 ILO, "Compulsory Sickness Insurance", p. 22. 
    43  For example, Carol Wright, the U.S. Commissioner of the Department of Labor, noted in the 
preface to a 1893 study of the German social insurance system: "If there is a subject within the whole 
range of social economics which relates to means for promoting the material, social, intellectual, and 
moral prosperity of labouring men and women it is that which deals with what is called the 'economic 
insecurity' attending the prosecution of great industries."  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Fourth Special 




under the administrative and financial supervision of the competent public authority and 
shall not be carried on with a view of profit."
44  The other social insurance conventions 
contained similar stipulations.   
  To the extent that the international system is a system of states, the integrity and 
stability of states is an international concern.  The institutional structure of the ILO and its 
actions in the interwar period reflect in part an interest in developing institutions that 
promote stability and integration within states.  Whether the ILO's program of social 
insurance could promote social stability and peace can be questioned.  One negative 
response is to trace a line from Bismarck's social reforms to the rise of national socialism 
in Germany and its disastrous consequences for world peace.  This is an example of 
national integration leading to fascism.  Another negative response is to point to the 
piecemeal development in Latin America of social insurance systems with strong 
occupational and class biases.  This is an example of social insurance as a mechanism of 
interest-group solidarity.  Yet social insurance can be an important means of promoting 
social solidarity of a non-fascist sort, as the expansion of the welfare state in Europe after 
World War II illustrates. 
 
III.  Social Reform and International Social Justice 
 
  The first acts of the first general session of the post-WWI peace conference at 
Versailles were to form three commissions:  one addressing responsibility for the war, 
another dealing with war crimes, and the third addressing international labor legislation.  
According to one observer, when the Great Powers first addressed these issues rather than 
                                                 
    44  For this conventions and other interwar social insurance conventions, see ILO, "The International 




the issues of redrawing boundaries and recreating nations, it "produced a degree of 
surprise that almost amounted to bewilderment."
45 These acts may have reflected delaying 
tactics in the face of disagreements on other issues.
46  Nonetheless, that these acts were 
grouped together may be revealing.  The first two acts reflect very basic impulses of 
justice; that international labor legislation was linked to these issues suggests that the calls 
for social justice in the Paris Peace Treaty went deeper than mere rhetorical flourishes. 
  The underlying argument of this appeal to social justice is that international action 
is warranted to uphold a shared understanding of the requirements of human dignity.  The 
refusal of one state to take action in support of human dignity of people outside the state 
is seen as either denying the humanity of those "others" or contradicting the state's own 
understanding of the imperatives of human dignity.  Two points should be noted in 
relation to this argument.  First, racism was at least implicitly an accepted practice at the 
time of the Treaty of Paris, and this situation certainly limited the consistency of 
arguments about human dignity.  Second, in practice objectives conflict and resources are 
limited.  An important issue is the ranking of different sorts of transnational obligations to 
uphold human dignity. 
  The ideals of social justice and human dignity that influenced the post-WWI 
reconstruction represented attempts to extract universals from European experience.  In 
connection with social reform, these attempts can once again be traced back at least to 
Daniel Legrand in the 1840's.  For Legrand, universals were Christianity and "the principle 
of family life."
47  The latter principle was historically more original, and Legrand pursued it 
forcefully.  He argued: "The destruction of the family is the festering wound of modern 
                                                 
    45 Shotwell, "Historical Significance of the International Labour Conference", in Solano, ed., Labour 
as an International Problem, p. 42. 
    46 Ibid., p. 43. 




industry and measures calculated to restore family life would be one of the greatest 
benefits procurable for the working classes."
48  The conservative element of this argument 
is unmistakable.  But it also represents an invocation of a common value to appeal to 
leaders across the political and social spectrum.   
  Another strand in the attempt to find common ground for the pursuit of 
international social reform was the work of social scientists.  In a massive mid-nineteenth 
century book on factory legislation, Edouard Ducpetiaux, a Belgian penologist and social 
reformer, proposed the formation of an international organization to coordinate social 
reform.  He called the organization the International Association for the Progress of Moral 
and Social Sciences.
49  While this proposal was not enacted, international dialogue among 
academics, labor leaders, and politicians concerning international social reform intensified 
in the second half of the nineteenth century.  The International Congress of Labor 
Legislation of 1897, a meeting of "university professors, economists, and 
parliamentarians," led to the establishment of the International Labour Office.
50  The Swiss 
provided an office and an annual contribution of 8,000 francs; the Office, however, was 
private and Stephen Bauer, a professor at the University of Basel, headed it.
51   
  The International Labor Office served as the archive and secretariat for the 
International Association for Labor Legislation (IALL).  Both organizations were 
dominated by scientifically oriented reformers.  After five years of careful background 
work, the IALL in 1906 passed two conventions -- one prohibited the employment of 
women during the night, and another prohibited the use of white phosphorus (which 
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caused a deadly disease) during the day. These two conventions illustrate the range of 
scientific interest of the day.  The convention on night work for women enjoyed 
widespread support.
52  Great Britain, Sweden, Austria-Hungary, and Belgium initially did 
not ratify the Phosphorus Convention.  Several cases of phosphorus necrosis aroused 
public attention and subsequently Britain, Austria, Spain, and Hungary ratified the 
Convention.
53  The scientific community surely played an important role generating 
publicity and persuading governments to adopt the convention.  On the other hand, the 
issues selected were selected because they were propitious, rather than particularly 
important. 
  Within the commission charged with addressing the issue of social legislation after 
WWI, there was considerable tension between advocates of substantive and formal 
notions of social justice.  The Americans, lead by Paul Gompers, favored a charter of 
specific rights of labor.  The most important issue for the Americans was trade union 
freedom.  The Americans were wary of encroachments on workers' freedom to make 
contracts and negotiate for their own benefits.  The General Principles of Article 427 of 
the Paris Peace Treaty reflects the American approach.  The principles include workplace 
rights (freedom of association, equal treatment of natives and aliens, equal pay for men 
and women) and workplace conditions (eight hour day, weekly rest, provision for 
workplace inspections).   Only two principles support a broader view of the needs of 
persons; first, that "labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of 
commerce," and second, that workers should receive "payment of a wage adequate to 
maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country."   
    The Europeans, on the other hand, saw the demands of social justice in more 
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specific, substantial terms.  Social justice involved, "the regulation of the labour supply, 
the prevention of unemployment...the protection of the worker against sickness, disease 
and injury arising out of unemployment,...provision for old age and injury...the 
organization of vocational and technical education."  These ideas were included in a 
different section of the Peace Treaty -- the Preamble to the Labor Section.   They required 
creation of new institutions that could provide services for workers.  Thus they focused on 
social transformation rather than on the rights of the worker.   
  ILO efforts to establish procedural rights for workers encountered considerable 
obstacles.  No progress was made on enacting a convention to support freedom of 
association.
54  The refusal of the U.S. to join the ILO in 1919 meant that freedom of 
association lost its main international champion.  Moreover, the issue of trade union rights 
became entangled with the question of the legitimacy of the credentials of the labor 
delegate from fascist Italy.  The Italian labor delegate's credentials were challenged on the 
grounds that his union was partly controlled by the government and had used violence to 
gain members.
55  These objections were voted down, but this confrontation highlighted 
some of tensions and complexities involved in affirming trade union rights. 
  The ILO also encountered obstacles in its attempts to address substantive issues of 
social justice such as the problem of unemployment.  The issue of unemployment was 
placed on the agenda for the first meeting of the International Labour Conference in 
Washington in 1919.  At the conference some delegates pointed out that shortages of raw 
materials in some countries in Europe were causing workers to be idle, and that a better 
distribution of raw materials in Europe would lessen unemployment.  Other delegates 
objected strongly, arguing that international control of raw material distribution would 
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infringe on property rights and sovereignty.
56  The Convention concluded by passing 
merely a recommendation that member states establish an effective system of 
unemployment insurance. 
  The problem of narrow issues opening onto much broader ones was a recurring 
one.  For example, a convention ratified at the Washington Conference in 1919 fixed the 
minimum age for the employment of children at 14 years of age.  The ILO noted that if 
compulsory school attendance does not last until that age, then children are "left to their 
own devices, without supervision or education or earnings, and exposed to the `dangers of 
the street'."
57  Thus the ILO resolved to study 
whether the Organisation [the ILO], in order to ensure the success of its decisions on 
the minimum age for admission to employment, should not endeavor to have the 
school age in every country raised to a point which will harmonise with these 
decisions.
58  
Increasing the capacity of the education system is connected to the elimination of child 
labor.  The problem is that it is much easier to forbid child labor than to develop new 
educational capabilities.   
  In the context of international concern about an expansive notion of social justice, 
the role of international conventions is questionable.  These conventions, which are not 
legally binding unless national parliaments ratify them, are best suited for forbidding very 
particular practices which are internationally recognized as repugnant.  Yet the ILO 
recognized that a substantive notion of social justice requires the development of social 
insurance institutions, an education system, means for managing employment levels, and 
other forms of social infrastructure.  Transforming a broad notion of social justice into 
rational priorities and concrete programs for international action was an elusive goal.  
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IV.  World War II and the Philadelphia Declaration 
 
  As World War II drew to a close, the ILO's position was precarious.  It was 
burdened with its association with the failed League of Nations.  The Soviet Union was 
hostile to it because it was seen as being too influenced by Western governments.  Toward 
the end of the war the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the 
Food and Agriculture Conference seemed to be encroaching on its mission.
59  The ILO 
responded by redefining and reasserting its mission in the Philadelphia Declaration of May, 
1944. 
  The Philadelphia Declaration forcefully asserted the primacy of a comprehensive 
notion of human rights. 
all human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to pursue both 
their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom 
and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity... 
The Conference affirms that the principles set forth in this Declaration are fully 
applicable to all peoples everywhere and that, while the manner of their application 
must be determined with due regard to the stage of social and economic development 
reached by each people, their progressive application to peoples who are still 
dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved self-government, is a 
matter of concern to the whole world.
60 
The international emergence of human rights in the modern period is usually associated 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  The above declaration, issued 
four years earlier, in fact embodies the central ideas of the human rights movement.  
Human rights are intrinsic rights of human beings, governments are obliged to support 
these rights, and their fulfillment is the concern of everyone.  The interdependence of 
economic and political rights was explicitly recognized; economic security was linked to 
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the freedom and dignity of persons in order to identify the failure of the fascist states, 
which traded economic security for personal freedom.
61  In place of the earlier, more 
varied objectives of economic and social reforms, the Philadelphia Declaration asserted 
that all national and international policies should be judged on the extent to which they 
further this new notion of human rights.    
  This new mission of the ILO was consonant with the ideas of President Roosevelt. 
 In remarks to the ILO Conference in New York in 1941, Roosevelt declared: 
We have learned too well that social problems and economic problems are not 
separate watertight compartments in the international any more that in the national 
sphere.  In international, as in national affairs, economic policy can no longer be an 
end in itself.  It is merely a means for achieving social objectives.
62  
These social objectives were expanded notions of earlier ideas of human dignity and 
freedom from want.  These ideas were translated into the language of human rights. 
  The ILO assumed for itself responsibility to judge all international economic and 
financial policies in terms of their implications for these human rights.  It pushed for 
inclusion in the guiding principles of the proposed United Nations Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development the goals of full employment and higher living standards. 
 It emphasized the importance of lending money on the basis of developmental needs as 
well as commercial criteria, and pointed out that productivity in countries could be raised 
"not only directly by the provision of capital equipment, but also indirectly by measures 
calculated to improve the health, welfare, and technical skill of the working population."
63 
 The ILO had mapped out an ambitious domain for international action and a key mission 
for itself.  But it was not a mission for which the ILO could sustain a claim to special 
authority or comparative advantage.  Moreover, the ILO left itself with little basis for 
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establishing practical priorities for action to support its new, bold mission.   
  The shift in the Philadelphia Declaration to an emphasis on human rights lead to a 
sharp de-emphasis of the arguments about international competition and social stability 
which had helped to initiate international reform efforts after World War I.
64  The earlier 
argument about the relationship between international competition and the possibility of 
national reform was broadened, "in light of subsequent experience," into the declaration 
that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere."
65  This latter 
argument bears little relationship to the historically and logically specific meaning of the 
earlier argument.  With respect to the earlier argument linking social stability and social 
justice to peace, the Declaration offered only a perfunctory mention.  The drafters of the 
Philadelphia Declaration looked at the issue from a different angle: 
...social justice can be attained only on the basis of assured peace.  The peace-loving 
people of the world must retain both the power or the will, and must establish and 
support the necessary machinery, to maintain international public order if they wish 
to be free to devote their energies to improving the well-being of their homesteads 
and townships.  Without political security, based on the harnessing of power as the 
servant of welfare, it will be impossible to pursue effectively long-range policies 
directed towards the maintenance of full employment and a rising standard of 
living.
66  
Thus instead of viewing social reform as a means for combating instability within states 
which could threaten the stability of other states, the ILO came to view political stability 
among states as a prerequisite for the pursuit of social justice within states.  This view 
meshed well with the emerging ideological needs of the Cold War. 
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V.  Conclusions 
 
  Arguments relating to international competition, social stability, and social justice 
prompted the formation of the ILO at the end of World War I.  Each of these arguments 
had different histories, different strengths and weakness, and had a different impact on the 
ILO's work in the interwar period.  In groping to establish its mission at the end of World 
War II, the ILO turned to embrace a comprehensive notion of human rights, a notion that 
later came to dominate international discussions of social reform.  The earlier arguments 
relating to international competition and social stability were largely dismissed. 
  Yet contemporary international efforts to promote social reform may benefit from 
taking these earlier arguments more seriously.  For example, instead of seeking to establish 
a priority between economic development and human rights, linking social reforms to 
trade liberalization or structural adjustment policies may provide a more flexible and 
fruitful framework.  Similarly, a dominant feature of the Cold War era has been a 
perceived dichotomy between security concerns and human rights concerns.  In the future 
instability within states is likely to be the key international security issue, and hence it is 
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